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New Era Agrarian Radicalism
Smith W. Brookhart and the Populist Critique
GEORGE WILLIAM MCDANIEL
THE NEW ERA was a period of modernization, marked by rapidly
expanding technology, corporate consolidation, social experi-
mentation and change, and, at least until the crash, popular ide-
alization of the virtues of businessmen. In 1925, when Calvin
Coolidge proclaimed that "the business of America is business,"
many Americans nodded their heads in collective assent. The
American business system had given most Americans a level of
prosperity they had never dreamed possible, and few were will-
ing to criticize it.
Despite the prominence of corporate values and their mf lu-
ence on public policy in the 1920s, however, other value systems
and perspectives remained alive and would regain some of their
previous influence in the 1930s. One of these was populism. Popu-
lists viewed corporate structures as "monopolies" and "tyrannies"
and tended instead to idealize "the people," people's associations,
and a people's government that could smite their enemies, serve as
their advocate, and preserve the "independence" of citizens and
communities. One of the most vocal exponents of the populist cri-
tique in the New Era was Iowa's junior senator during the period.
Smith Wildman Brookhart. This populist critique had its roots in
the political populism of the late nineteenth century, which was
represented by the 1892 presidential campaign of another of
Iowa's best-known political figures, James Baird Weaver.
Weaver and the Populists looked back to a simpler time, a
time of the Jeffersonian ideal of yeomen farmers working their
land, a time of decentralized government, a time that probably
existed only as a romanticized myth. Their heroes were Thomas
An earlier version of this article was read at the Missouri Valley History
Conference, March 14, 1986.
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Jefferson, with his belief that it was the "distribution" of powers,
not their "consolidation," that marked good government; and
Andrew Jackson, who fought against the centralizing tenden-
cies of a national bank. The Populists believed that their ideal
was enshrined in the Declaration of Independence and its proc-
lamation that "all men are created equal," that governments de-
rive "their powers from the consent of the governed," and that
they are instituted to secure the rights of the people. This state-
ment of ideals, said Weaver, was "the most wonderful political
enunciation in any language."^
Throughout the nineteenth century, however, this ideal of
equality, the Populists claimed, had been eroded by a series of
laws and Supreme Court decisions that had created corpora-
tions and given them special favors. In a further quest for power
the growing corporations had organized themselves into trusts.
This "corporate rapacity" had combined with a "federal machin-
ery" that was supposed to have secured individual equality but
instead had created a society best represented by the characters
of "dives and Lazarus," a society filled with the contrasts of
"bountiful harvests accompanied by ever-existing destitution."^
As enunciated by Weaver, the Populist vision promoted the
individual citizen's opportunity to make his or her own way. The
goal was not equality of results but rather a society where each
citizen had an equal opportunity to advance using his or her
own abilities. What had once been a "fairly free field [for] indi-
vidual enterprise" had allegedly been transformed into a "cen-
tralized government . . . administered by great capitalists." For
Weaver and other populists the great cry had become, "Equal
Rights to All; Special Privileges to None."^
As a political force, the Populists of the 1890s drew strength
from a heritage of organizational activity among southern and
northern farmers. In the years following the Civil War, agrarian
1. James B. Weaver, A Call to Action (Des Moines, 1892), 435. The general
outline of Weaver's thinking in those days can be found in this book. Written in
1891, it was sold the next year as a means of raising campaign funds. See also
John L. Thomas, Alternative America: Henry George, Edward Bellamy, Henry
Demarest Lloyd and the Adversary Tradition (Cambridge, Mass., 1983), 365.
2. Weaver, Call, 248, 362, 439.
3. Edward Bellamy, "The Programme of the Nationalists," The Forum 17
(March 1894), 82; "// Elected ...": Unsuccessful Candidates for the Presidency,
1796-1968 (Washington, D.C., 1972), 272.
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reformers had organized as Grangers, Anti-Monopolists, or
Greenbackers; and beginning in the 1880s the Farmers Alliances
had appeared, urging farmers to organize cooperatives to enable
them to take matters into their own hands. But organizational
failures and lack of capital had doomed such efforts to apply co-
operative principles. Nevertheless, working together in coopera-
tives, people had allegedly learned that "though the hour was
late, the people could be rallied to defend the democratic idea.
. . . Here, perhaps, was the heart of the Populist belief: though
the democratic heritage was imperiled by the demands of the in-
dustrial culture, the people were not yet helpless victims."*
On these matters. Smith Brookhart came to believe that the
Populists had been right. They had identified the threat to a
democratic order, which they defined in Jeffersonian terms, but
they had rejected Jeffersonian solutions. Instead, they had
championed the idea that when a system of special privileges
developed, the people had the right to band together to demand
justice from their government and equal access to the benefits of
commerce and society.
BROOKHART HAD FIRST MET JAMES WEAVER in the early 1890s, and
he often visited the Weaver home before and during Weaver's
1892 presidential campaign, but at the time he was unimpressed
with Weaver's ideas.^ Brookhart had begun his political life in
the 1890s as a county seat town lawyer in rural. Republican
Iowa. A lifelong dry, in 1894 he was sought out by the conserva-
tive Republican organization to run for county attorney on a
platform pledged to enforce Iowa's local option liquor laws. Re-
elected in 1896 and 1898 he remained a loyal member of the
party and seemed headed for a successful political career.*
By the turn of the century the Republican party in Iowa was
in a turmoil. Standpat, old-line conservative Republicans and
4. Lawrence Goodwyn, Democratic Promise: The Populist Moment in
America (NewYork, 1976), 272. See also Solon Justus Buck, The Granger Move-
ment: A Study of Agricultural Organization and Its Political, Economic, and Social
Manifestations, 1870-1880 {Cambridge, Mass., 1913), 261.
5. Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 4th sess., 1922-23, 2129.
6. For an account of Brookhart's start in politics, see George William
McDaniel, "Prohibition Debate in Washington County, 1890-1894: Smith
Wildman Brookhart's Introduction to Politics," The Annals of Iowa 45 (Winter
1981), 519-36.
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progressive Republicans were fighting for control of the party.
The principal economic force in the state was the railroads, and
through their economic grip on the state the railroads also effec-
tively controlled the political process. Standpat Republicans
tended to support the railroad interests. Through a series of re-
forms the progressives, led by Governor Albert B. Cummins,
sought to free the political process from railroad control. The
progressives also sought to control the railroads and other large
economic interests through regulation.
Brookhart initially supported Cummins and the aims of the
progressives. In time, however, he came to believe that, at least
in the case of the railroads, regulation was not sufficient; he sup-
ported government ownership of the railroads, instead. During
World War I the federal government did take over operation of
the railroads. Once the war was over, however. Senator Albert
Cummins cosponsored a bill to return the railroads to private
ownership. Brookhart believed that Cummins had abandoned
progressivism, and in 1920 he unsuccessfully challenged the in-
cumbent for his Senate seat.
The farm depression that began in late 1920 served as the
catalyst for yet another transformation of Smith Brookhart. As
the farm crisis of the 1920s took shape and persisted, he began to
see the wisdom of Weaver's ideas.'' He applied a populist critique
to the new'situation and urged Iowa farmers to rally to defend
the democratic idea and to take matters into their own hands by
joining together in cooperatives.
During World War I and the immediate postwar years agri-
cultural prices rose dramatically. As a result of the higher prices
and a favorable credit structure, farmers expanded their opera-
tions, bought more land and equipment, improved their farms,
and invested in new farm machines as well as automobiles and
other consumer items. Then, beginning in mid-1920, prices
began to fall; in the second half of that year average prices of ten
leading crops fell 57 percent, and by the following spring prices
were one-third of what they had been the previous June.«
The chief villain, as farmers saw it, was the Federal Reserve
Board. In May 1920 it had met with the Federal Advisory Coun-
7. Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 4th sess., 1922-23, 2129.
8. James H. Shideler, Farm Crisis, 1919-1923 (Berkeley and Los Angeles,
1957), 46.
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cil and Class A Directors of the Federal Reserve banks from
across the country and surveyed the credit situation. Alarmed at
the continuing increase of speculative acvitiy fueled by easy
credit, it had raised the rediscount rate and urged member banks
to curtail credit and "discourage loans for capital and speculative
purposes."'
In late 1921 and early 1922 the squeeze on farmers became
even more acute. Brookhart reacted strongly. At a Farmer's
Union meeting in Fairfield in October 1921, he asserted that the
"control of credit is the source of economic power," and argued
that farmers in the past had been "systematically robbed" be-
cause they were not organized with the same intelligence as big
business. Then at a meeting of the Conference of Farm and
Labor Organizations in November, he urged a joint effort to le-
galize cooperative banks in Iowa.'" And when one of Iowa's
Senate seats became available in early 1922 Brookhart seized the
opportunity to take his message to a larger forum.
Two years earlier Brookhart had entered the Republican
senatorial primary in an unsuccessful attempt to unseat the
incumbent, Albert B. Cummins. Brookhart not only lost that
election, but his challenge of the party structure earned him a
reputation as an outsider. Now openly opposed by the Iowa Re-
publican party, Brookhart took his program of governmental aid
to agricultural cooperatives directly to the people. He won the
Senate seat by a wide margin, but his victory widened the rift
between himself and the party. Moreover, the statist implica-
tions of his program, coupled with his longtime advocacy of
government ownership of the railroads, allowed his opponents
to paint him as a dangerous radical flirting with Bolshevism.
Those allegations and his reputation as an outsider would con-
tinue to hamper his efforts to achieve his legislative goals.
Following his election to the Senate in 1922, Brookhart
began to push for governmental aid to agriculture. According to
Brookhart, there were ample precedents for having the federal
government play a role in the recovery of agriculture. The gov-
9. Federal Reserve Bulletin (Washington, D.C, 1920), 556. See also
George Soule, Prosperity Decade, From War to Depression: 1917-1929 (New
York, 1947), 96-106.
10. Homestead, 3 November 1921; Iowa Union Farmer, 16 November
1921.
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ernment, after all, had assisted other sectors of the economy. For
example, it had created a commercial bank system that had not
served agriculture well. It had compounded that with a Federal
Reserve system that had been the principal cause of the depres-
sion. And following a period of wartime operation, it had subsi-
dized the railroads in ways that had required farmers to pay
higher freight rates. Farmers, Brookhart said, were "entitled to
some consideration at the hands of the government." The kind
of "consideration" that Brookhart had in mind was government
aid that would allow farmers to form national marketing cooper-
atives, assist them in recouping their cost of production plus a
reasonable profit, and provide special funds to cover any losses
incurred in implementing such guarantees. His farm bill, he
said, would accomplish those ends; it would give agriculture the
same "economic chance" that other businesses and industries
had enjoyed under the "laws enacted by our government.""
Although Brookhart introduced his farm bill a number of
times, he never got much of a hearing for it. Part of the problem
was that it challenged basic assumptions about the American
business and banking system. Besides, it was Smith Brook-
hart's program, and his reputation as a radical and a legislative
loner offset any chance for serious consideration of his pro-
gram. But his analysis of governmental and corporate struc-
tures, whose actions he believed had led to the depression, took
him back to his earliest political education—the populism of
James B. Weaver.
BROOKHART SHARED THE POPULISTS' FAITH in the notion of equality.
He took the Declaration of Independence and the Constitu-
tion literally as documents that enshrined equality of opportu-
nity as the very foundation of Americanism, and he saw the
Jeffersonian world of yeomen farmers as the best example of
how that equality was to be achieved. So when Brookhart fought
for equality for agriculture, he meant not only parity in the mar-
ketplace and the political arena but also the preservation of
small individual farmers on their own land. Writing in 1927, he
declared that he was "unalterably opposed to corporation own-
11. Congressional Record, 68th Cong., 1st sess., 1923-24,1085,1086.
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ership of land." What he would later term the "chain farm" was
opposed to the very nature of Americanism.^^
Brookhart applied a similar argument in critiquing the
growth of chain stores. In his view, small independent mer-
chants stood alongside their neighbors, the small farmers, as co-
heirs of the Jeffersonian idea. Yet increasingly in the :l920s
small, independent, locally owned stores found themselves
competing with units of statewide or nationwide mercantile
chains. As early as 1922 Brookhart had urged small business-
men to organize lest the "chain-store idea" force them onto the
"rocks of disaster." As he saw it, the chain store was an "evil" mo-
nopoly, similar to the other monopolies that he had long fought.
Like them, it had taken advantage of the "vicious system of cor-
poration laws" and was now in the process of taking business
away from local merchants and destroying the "civic life of the
small communities." As a defense against chain stores,
Brookhart urged that local merchants form cooperatives similar
to the cooperatives he had long urged for farmers. They might
do so as "home defense leagues" or "community builders,' and
he noted that some had already been established. In Des
Moines, for example, about seven hundred independent grocers
were engaged in cooperative purchasing that was helping them
to compete with chain grocers."
Brookhart also sought to assist independent motion picture
theater owners. Their "enemies" at the time were the large mo-
tion picture companies, which had consolidated the production
end of the rapidly growing industry and were trying to establish
12. Des Moines Register, 29 November 1927; U.S., Congress, Senate,
Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, Hearings on S.I, 71st Cone., 1st sess
25 March 1929, 9.
13. Iowa City Press Citizen, 27 March 1922; Smith W. Brookhart, "The RetaU
Merchant and Community Development," National Grocers Bulletin (Special
Convention Edition, 1928), 53-54; Smith W. Brookhart, "The Chain Store Mo-
nopoly," Speech, Institute of Public Affairs, University of Virginia, 10 July 1931,
Manuscripts Department, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville; Smith
W. Brookhart, "On Chain Stores," The NA.R.D. Journal 49 (3 October 1929), 36;
Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 3d sess., 1930-31, 3924-26. Brookhart spoke
on the chain store issue before the following groups: National Convention of Re-
tail Grocers, National Association of Retail Druggists, Retail Meat Dealers Associ-
ation. See also Rowland Berthoff, "Independence and Enterprise: Small Business
in the American Dream," in Stuart W. Bruchey, ed.. Small Business in American Life
(New York, 1980), 28-48.
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control over the exhibition end, partly by opening their own the-
aters but also through a block-booking system that forced inde-
pendent exhibitors to take all or much of a studio's output in
order to obtain the pictures they wanted to exhibit. This had
both economic ramifications and a social or moral dimension.
Economically, it meant that exhibitors had to pay to lease movies
that they could not or would not show, or that they knew would
not be patronized in their communities. Morally, it encouraged
theater owners to show movies that undermined the communi-
ty's moral structure. It was another example, Brookhart be-
lieved, of the evil exercise of monopoly power.
Between 1927 and 1932 Brookhart introduced three bills
aimed at preventing "restraint upon free competition" through
the practice of block-booking. In remarks accompanying his
third movie bill Brookhart urged the Senate to see the "wisdom
of dissolving . . . chains of theaters and leaving the field . . . to
the independent operators." But in speaking about the bills he
also stressed the social and moral aspects of block-booking.
Movies, he said, were second only to homes, schools, and
churches in their influence for "good or evil" on the "culture,
habits, and morals of the public."!" Despite his efforts on behalf
of independent merchants and theater operators, his bills met
with strong opposition, and like so many of his proposals they
languished in committee.
THE FIGHT to preserve small farmers and small businessmen was
just one manifestation of Brookhart's abiding populism, which
had as its general theme the belief that economic opportunity
ought to be a universal characteristic, that each individual ought
to be in control of his or her own life. As a corollary, he held that
sovereignty lay in the people and was to be exercised through
14. Congressional Record, 72d Cong., 1st sess., 1931-32, 4500, 4493.
Brookhart seemed to stop just short of calling for prior censorship. He would
rather have the community make the decision as to whether a movie would be
shown. At about the same time he discussed the same question as it related to
printed matter. Speaking about the importation of books alleged to be ob-
scene, he said that the legislature ought to define what was obscene and then
have the courts try cases based on the legal definition. He was opposed to hav-
ing the courts, or clerks in the same office, make the decision about obscenity.
See Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 1st sess., 1929, 4455-56; 71st Cong., 2d
sess., 1929-30, 5248.
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their elected representatives. As James B. Weaver had put it in
1892, 'elective control" was the "only safeguard of liberty," and
representatives of the people should therefore work to bring in-
stitutions like the Senate, the executive, and especially the Su-
preme Court under this kind of popular control. The Supreme
Court, according to Weaver, had acquired a power—the power
of judicial review—that the founders had never intended it to
have, and it had used that power to shield and protect such ene-
mies of democracy as the slave power and big business corpora-
tions. The way to advance democracy was to return to the intent
of the founders, make the legislature the "supreme power," and
put the judiciary back in a "subordinate" role.^ ^
Brookhart agreed with Weaver's analysis. In 1912, in a se-
ries of articles on the issue of judicial recall, he echoed Weaver,
arguing that the courts were the "last refuge of the big interests
and the jackpotters." Their power to set aside legislative actions
was in his view a "great menace" to liberty. As a remedy, he advo-
cated the recall of judges by election. This, he wrote, was
"merely re-clothing the ballot box with the power it extended to
the judiciary in the first instance. There is no power, in a republi-
can form of government, that should be higher than the ballot
box as a last resort on any question."i^
It was not surprising, then, that in 1930 Brookhart should
use the occasion of the nomination of Charles Evans Hughes to
be chief justice for a renewed attack on the Supreme Court. The
court, he noted, contained some progressives willing to put
"human rights" ahead of "property rights."!^ But historically it
had served the latter and had helped to produce a government
engaged in unequal treatment of its citizens. Confirmation of
Hughes, who had a background as a corporation lawyer, would
add to the court one more justice committed to maintaining the
status quo.
In conjunction with this attack, Brookhart also advocated
judicial election and recall, and he introduced a Senate resolu-
tion in favor of requiring a unanimous decision for the Supreme
Court to declare a law unconstitutional. If anyone was to decide
the constitutionality of a law, he thought, it should be the peo-
15. Weaver, Call, 70, 73,132.
16. Washington County Press, 18 January, 11 April, 22 February 1912.
17. Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 2d sess., 1929-30, 3505.
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pie's openly elected representatives, who were "just as honest"
as any court and just as capable of following the Constitution.
They had been elected by people who were competent to govern
themselves and to select representatives who would follow the
Constitution. The basic principle should be that "the Constitu-
tion made by the people should be construed by the representa-
tives of the people."^*
Brookhart's attacks on chain stores, movie moguls, and the
Supreme Court came late in his Senate career and were logical
extensions of his populist critique. But these new targets had not
made him forget his original foes. Wall Street and the Federal Re-
serve system. In July 1929, in an article entitled "Has the Federal
Reserve Act Failed?" he warned that unchecked speculation in
the stock market could produce "one of the gravest economic cri-
ses" in American history.^^ In October, when the crash came, he
quickly concluded that the Federal Reserve system had been a
disastrous regulatory failure. It had allowed credit to collect in
the large New York banks and to be used by them to fuel the
speculative fever, an activity that was little more than gambling
with the money that should have been available to farmers for
credit. Now, not just farmers but the entire nation had suffered
the consequences. With a vehemence that was strong even for
him, Brookhart declared that Congress "ought to kill this gam-
bling business. . . . I mean kill it; I do not mean compromise or
regulate it or anything of the kind."2°
As might be expected, Brookhart found the solution in the
kind of cooperative banking system that he had long advocated.
In February 1928 he introduced a bill to establish federal cooper-
ative banks and a cooperative reserve system, a bill that Secre-
tary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon said would "impose upon
the banking structure of the country a confusing duplication of
functions and machinery" at "variance with the fundamental
18. Ibid., 3647,6227. He opposed the World Court for the same reasons.
In a speech delivered in 1929 he asked, "who shall make the laws for this
World Court? There is no legislative branch of this super-government for the
making of laws, it will of its own volition make its own laws. This is a contra-
diction of the fundamental principles of Americanism." Speech, "The World
Court," Brookhart Papers, State Historical Society of Iowa, Des Moines.
19. Smith W. Brookhart, "Has the Federal Reserve Act Failed?" Plain Talk
5üulyl929), 1.
20. Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 2d sess., 1929-30, 595-98.
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purposes of the Federal Reserve Act." In January 1930 Brookhart
offered the bill again, found that Mellon was still opposed, and
bemoaned the fact that the United States was "the only civilized
country which prohibits the farmer and labor from organizing
their own savings into a cooperative credit system under their
own control." Brookhart submitted the bill again, and for a third
time the Treasury Department opposed it. The bill died in the
Senate Banking Committee, and with it died Brookhart's hope
of cooperation as the solution to farm credit needs and specula-
tive excess.^ ^
In 1931 Brookhart again returned to his populist roots with
criticisms of the gold standard reminiscent of those once made
by the Greenbackers, the Populist party, and the William
Jennings Bryan wing of the Democratic party. The gold system,
Brookhart argued, should be ended, and in December 1931 he
inti-oduced a bill to bring this about. The system, he said, was not
the sole or even the primary cause of the depression. But a better
system more capable of preventing depressions could be devel-
oped. He could see no reason why the country should continue
to "cling to this fetish" of gold. Its proponents had promised
"eternal prosperity," but instead the country had got a "depres-
sion every few years."^^
The traditional Populist remedy of bimetalism, Brookhart
thought, would be an improvement over the existing system.^ ^
But the real answer, he finally decided, was a dollar based on the
value of all commodities rather than on precious metals alone,
and a supply of dollars that would grow at a steady rate rather
than being determined by the Federal Reserve Board. He pro-
posed to calculate the aggregate value of all 550 commodities
that entered into the Department of Labor's calculation of the
consumer price index and to keep the value of the dollar at a
fixed fraction of this aggregate value. The money supply should
21. Congressional Record, 70th Cong., 1st sess., 1927-28, 2502; 71st
Cong., 2d sess., 1929-30, 1903; 72d Cong., 1st sess., 1931-32, 190; Andrew
Mellon to Peter Norbeck, 15 March 1929, 22 January 1930, 26 January 1932,
Record Group 56, "Records of the Department of the Treasury," Office of the
General Counsel, Non-Tax Legislative History File, National Archives, Wash-
ington, D.C; New York Times, 10 February 1930.
22. New York Times, 11 December 1931; Congressional Record, 72d Cone
1st sess., 1931-32,10846.
23. Congressional Record, 72a Cong., 1st sess., 1931-32, 2629-30.
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increase by four percent per year, a figure that represented the
long-term average annual increase in net national income. In ef-
fect, he would combine the commodity dollar plan advanced by
various other monetary reformers at the time with the kind of
fixed monetary growth rule advocated by both populist and
conservative critics of the Federal Reserve System.^ *
Brookhart hoped his scheme would stabilize the value of
the dollar and keep enough dollars in circulation in a way that
the gold standard could not. He proposed it in 1932, but few
people bothered to comment since by that time, he was, for all
practical purposes, a lame duck senator.
THE POPULIST PERCEPTIONS AND PRESCRIPTIONS that early became a
part of Brookhart's mental makeup explain much about
Brookhart and the political analysis and remedies he offered.
John D. Hicks, the first scholarly historian of the Populist move-
ment, wrote, "In formulating their principles the Populists rea-
soned that the ordinary, honest, willing American worker, be he
farmer or be he laborer, might expect in this land of opportunity
not only the chance to work but also, as the rightful reward of his
labor, a fair degree of prosperity."" According to Brookhart,
when the "rightful reward" of their labor was not forthcoming,
farmers and laborers ought to join together in cooperatives to at-
tain power for themselves. And like the Populists, Brookhart be-
lieved that there could be a people's government responsive to
their needs for relief and justice and capable of acting as their
advocate in the marketplace.
To some extent, Brookhart also embraced the Populist ideal
of restoring a golden age when individual farmers had worked
their own land and controlled their own destinies and had lived
in harmony with small independent businessmen. But his
Jeffersonian rhetoric should not lead one to believe that he was
merely an agrarian Luddite railing against the machines of prog-
ress or the making of wealth. His main complaints were about
industrial wealth made at the expense of farmers and the ar-
24. Smith W. Brookhart, "Let's Abandon the Gold Standard," The Forum
88 üuly 1932), 10-12. See also Congressional Record, 72a Cong., 1st sess.,
1931-32, 2629-30.
25. John D. Hicks, The Populist Revolt: A History of the Farmers' Alliance
and the People's Party (Minneapolis, 1931), 405.
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rangements that kept farmers from sharing in the economic
rewards.
Drawing on his populist beliefs and perspectives, Brookhart
expressed the predicament of agricultural depression in the
midst of general prosperity. Iowa farmers responded by sending
him to the Senate by large margins. In the end, however, he was
unable to enact his populist programs, in part because they
seemed to challenge too many basic assumptions of the prevail-
ing corporate philosophy, but also because his reputation as an
outsider and a radical made it difficult for him to form the politi-
cal alliances necessary for success.
Nevertheless, in Brookhart and others like him, an older
populist critique of big business and corporate development
remained alive in the corporate-minded New Era. Brookhart's
electoral successes showed that such a critique could appeal to
distressed farmers as an explanation of and a remedy for their
plight, and fed into a revival of populist thinking and pre-
scriptions in the New Deal era. The rise of a bureaucratic order
and a new organizational politics conducted by functional
elites would have to accommodate the persistence of these
populist ideals.
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